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Abstract 
Over the last decade, the European Union has adopted legislation that calls for the mutual 
recognition of arrest warrants, investigation orders, and penal judgments. These laws have aimed 
to strengthen the Union’s response to transnational crime, and EU policymakers are currently 
considering legislation to further harmonize law enforcement efforts. This Article compares these 
developments within the EU to the U.S. legal framework on mutual recognition in criminal 
matters. It examines the individual, state and systemic interests that U.S. state courts have 
considered in deciding whether to recognize other states' judgments, warrants, or investigative 
actions. These competing interests have produced relatively uniform rules on extradition, but 
much more diverse and fragmented laws concerning the gathering of evidence, the admissibility 
of evidence, and the recognition of foreign penal judgments.  
The Article argues that three key factors explain the diversity of U.S. legal rules in many of these 
areas: 1) the tradition of federalism, which values local control over criminal matters; 2) the 
baseline harmonization of criminal procedures under the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees a 
high level of procedural fairness and strengthens mutual trust among states in criminal matters; 
and 3) the regular intervention by the U.S. federal government in investigations and prosecutions 
of cases with interstate elements, which reduces the pressure on states to devise a more uniform 
approach. The Article concludes by examining how these insights may be useful to ongoing 
debates within the European Union about the direction and scope of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters. 
I. Introduction
Over the last decade, the European Union has embarked on an ambitious 
program to enhance cooperation among member states in criminal cases. It has adopted 
directives that call for the mutual recognition of arrest warrants, evidence warrants, and 
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penal judgments, and it is considering a number of new initiatives that aim to 
strengthen the Union’s response to transnational crime. In support of these efforts, 
Union legislators have argued that the freedom of movement guaranteed by EU law has 
allowed cross-border crime to flourish and that law enforcement agencies must 
cooperate across state lines in order to address the rise in transnational crime. While 
legislators have stressed the need for more effective coordination among judicial and 
law enforcement authorities, commentators have pointed out that criminal suspects, 
victims and witnesses have rights and interests that may in some cases justify limiting 
member state cooperation in criminal matters.2 The scope of mutual recognition—and 
how it should be balanced against other legitimate interests—remains the subject of 
intense debate.  
 As EU policymakers continue to discuss these matters, it may be helpful to 
examine how the criminal justice system in the United States has handled conflicts of 
law and requests for cooperation among the fifty states and the federal government. 
Although states within the United States are, unlike EU member states, not fully 
sovereign, they retain primary authority over criminal justice. The federal structure 
established by the U.S. Constitution embraces the diversity of state approaches to 
criminal law and criminal procedure, while at the same time setting a threshold for 
individual rights protection below which no state system may fall.  
This Article argues that the constitutional guarantee of a minimum level of 
procedural fairness across the United States is a key reason why U.S. states have proven 
more willing to trust one another in multi-jurisdictional cases. The relative similarity of 
substantive criminal laws has also helped facilitate mutual recognition. These influences 
are particularly evident in decisions to extradite suspects, but also in some decisions to 
                                                 
2 European Criminal Policy Initiative, A Manifesto on European Criminal Procedure Law, 11 ZIS 430, 433-36 
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allow the admission of evidence obtained in other states and to recognize the penal 
judgments of other U.S. states.  
At the same time, U.S. states have not adopted an entirely uniform approach to 
conflicts of law in criminal cases because the American tradition of federalism has 
fostered a strong belief in the value of local control over criminal matters. Likewise, 
concern about the diminution of individual rights has kept some states from 
recognizing foreign penal judgments or admitting evidence obtained in another state. In 
such cases, we see states striving to balance three key interests: state sovereignty and 
local control over criminal policy; individual rights; and the broader stability of the U.S. 
legal system as a whole. In some circumstances, such as extradition, systemic interests 
are more prominent while concerns about state sovereignty and individual rights are 
abated. As a result, we see smoother cooperation and near-automatic recognition of 
warrants from sister states. By contrast, questions about admissibility of evidence and 
the recognition of penal judgments require state courts to apply other states’ law as part 
of their judgment about the culpability of the defendant or the legality of law 
enforcement actions. This brings to the fore concerns about local control over criminal 
policy and about individual rights. Courts are therefore less likely to defer to the laws 
and judgments of sister states in these matters.  
The tradition of federalism and the baseline harmonization of criminal laws and 
procedures are important explanations for why U.S. states have felt less pressure to 
develop uniform rules on choice of law in multi-jurisdictional cases. But another key 
reason for the lack of formalized rules on mutual recognition is that the U.S. federal 
government regularly assumes control over cases with interstate elements, saving states 
from having to resolve questions about which state law governs and why. The 
European Union lacks such a centralized enforcement mechanism and therefore has 
found it more pressing to develop rules that promote mutual recognition in cross-
border criminal cases. 
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One can glean three main insights from the American experience that may be useful 
to ongoing debates within the European Union about mutual recognition. The first 
insight is that an effective system of mutual recognition requires trust in the criminal 
justice systems of other member states. This, in turn, requires a degree of legal 
harmonization in order to ensure a high minimum level of procedural fairness in all 
member states and to narrow stark differences in penal norms. The second insight is 
that a federal enforcement mechanism reduces the need for mutual recognition 
instruments (and conversely, that uniform rules on mutual recognition may be more 
important where a polity lacks such centralized enforcement). And lastly, the U.S. 
experience shows that mutual recognition may work more smoothly in some areas than 
in others, depending on the relevant individual, state, and system interests at stake. 
II. The U.S. Constitution, Federalism, and Criminal Law 
To understand interstate conflict and cooperation in criminal cases in the United 
States, it is necessary first to review the division of power between state and federal 
authorities in criminal justice matters. In the United States, police powers are generally 
reserved to the states. Each of the fifty states independently enacts and enforces its own 
criminal laws and has its own criminal procedure rules, subject to certain constraints set 
by the federal Constitution. While this federal structure produces criminal statutes that 
often vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the level of dissimilarity is significantly 
smaller than within EU member states, for at least two reasons. First, the English 
common-law tradition has provided a common basis for the development of American 
state criminal law frameworks, so any variation occurs against the background of this 
shared tradition.3 Second, the Model Penal Code, designed with the aim of streamlining 
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state criminal codes, has significantly reduced diversity in these codes in the second half 
of the twentieth century.4 
In addition to the various state statutes, federal criminal law also affects how multi-
jurisdictional cases might be handled. It is therefore helpful to examine briefly the scope 
and place of federal criminal law. Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress can pass criminal laws to regulate conduct that substantially affects interstate 
commerce.5 As a result of improvements in transportation and technology in the 
twentieth century, much of human interaction today can be said to substantially affect 
interstate commerce. It has therefore proven relatively easy for Congress to justify 
intervention in criminal matters, and federal criminal lawmaking has burgeoned in the 
second half of the twentieth century.6 As of 2008, Congress had enacted statutes 
defining more than 4,450 federal crimes.7  
Federal prosecutions over the last decade have focused primarily on drug crimes, 
immigration crimes, and white-collar crimes, as well as other crimes that are deemed to 
harm national interests or have interstate elements.8 At the same time, in more than 95% 
of federal prosecutions, the same conduct could also be prosecuted under state criminal 
laws.9 A key reason for choosing federal over state prosecution is that federal statutes 
tend to provide for significantly longer sentences.10 A federal prosecution may also 
                                                 
4 Id. at 1072. 
5 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Congress also has the power to create criminal law under 
other provisions, but these are less frequently used. NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 19-21 (2005). 
6 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998) (finding that “[m]ore than 40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the 
Civil War have been enacted since 1970”). 
7 JOHN S. BAKER, REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES, at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crimes.  
8 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 10, Criminal Chart 
2.2 (2012), at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2012/12statrpt.pdf. 
9 John Baker, State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 678 (1999). 
10 Rachel Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
519, 573-77 (2011). 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Interstate Conflict and Cooperation in Criminal Cases: An American Perspective  
6 
 
afford to prosecutors special procedural advantages in areas ranging from wiretapping 
and witness cooperation to the admissibility of evidence.11 Federal intervention is 
likewise preferred when criminal conduct spills over state borders and requires law 
enforcement operations in more than one jurisdiction.12 Federal prosecutions remain 
critical in cases with interstate elements. That said, state criminal justice systems still 
handle the bulk of criminal law enforcement and prosecutions in the United States. 
More than 98% of prosecutions in the country occur at the state level.13  
Like prosecutions, law enforcement is also typically handled separately by federal 
and state authorities. State and local law enforcement officers14 enforce state law, and 
federal law enforcement officers enforce federal law. When a case has elements that 
reach beyond a single jurisdiction, however, law enforcement officials from different 
jurisdictions may cooperate with one another based on ad hoc arrangements and, 
occasionally, based on more formal interstate agreements. More commonly, federal 
authorities may entirely take over a case that spills over state borders,15 and 
increasingly, local and federal agencies may join together in “multijurisdictional task 
forces.” These task forces were first created to respond to drug crimes and organized 
crime, but they have expanded to cover more areas, such as white-collar crime, 
cybercrime, and terrorism.16  
Federal-state cooperation in criminal cases may occur at the request of state 
authorities or on the initiative of the federal government. Under U.S. principles of 
                                                 
11 Id. at 531. 
12 Baker, supra note 9, at 701. 
13 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Considering State and Federal Criminal Justice Processes, 1 CRIM. PROC. §1.2(e) (3d 
ed. 2013). 
14 Police officers and prosecutors are typically employees of city or county governments, not state 
governments. 
15 See Barkow, supra note 10, at 572. 
16 Sandra Guerra Thompson, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and 
Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159 (1995); Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring Challenge 
of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293, 297, 321-22 (2013). 
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federalism, the federal government may not require state authorities to join its 
enforcement efforts.17 The government can, however, use financial incentives to induce 
state governments to do so. Multi-jurisdictional task forces are therefore typically 
initiated, funded and operated by the federal government, although they depend 
heavily on the manpower of local and state law enforcement agencies.18  
Joint task forces—while extremely useful in interstate cases—have been criticized by 
some for expanding into areas where there is no proven need for them. An example 
might be federal prosecutions of violent crime committed with a gun that has traveled 
across state lines.19 This federalization of criminal justice is seen as problematic for 
several reasons. First, it is said to undermine state autonomy in determining law 
enforcement priorities.20 This is problematic because state and local authorities are 
presumed to be more attuned to the needs of local communities. Federalization is also 
seen as suboptimal because of its high cost. Federal prosecutions are typically at least 
three times as expensive as equivalent state prosecutions.21  
Finally, federal prosecutions of cases that can be handled locally may raise concerns 
from the perspective of protecting individual rights. At present, states often provide 
more generous procedural rights to criminal defendants than the federal government 
does. Defendants may therefore face significantly harsher penalties in federal court, yet 
have narrower procedural protections than they would in an equivalent state 
prosecution.22 Likewise, under the “dual sovereignty” exception to the Double Jeopardy 
                                                 
17 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
18 Thompson, supra note 16, at 1182-83, 1187. 
19 Baker, supra note 9, at 682. 
20 Id. at 686; see also Thompson, supra note 16, at 1183-85. 
21 Baker, supra note 9, at 689 (noting that this occurs largely because lawyers and judges are paid more in 
federal prosecutions). 
22 Baker, supra note 9; James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Are We 
Repeating the Mistakes of the Past?, 55 MD. L. REV. 223 (1996); see also Logan, supra note 16 (noting that joint 
task forces frequently allow state officers to benefit from more government friendly federal procedures 
and to evade more demanding state standards). An important counterpoint, however, is that the 
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Clause, the federal government can prosecute a defendant for the same conduct of 
which the defendant has been convicted or acquitted in state court, and a state 
government can do the same with a defendant finally adjudged in federal court. This 
loophole has been used by multijurisdictional task forces to get “two bites at the apple” 
by prosecuting the same defendant in federal court after a state prosecution has failed 
(or less frequently, in state court after an unsuccessful federal prosecution). As the 
federal and state authorities work jointly in such operations, scholars have questioned 
whether the “dual sovereignty” exception should apply and have criticized the erosion 
of double jeopardy protections.23 
This brief overview of the American federal system reveals an important difference 
between the institutions that enforce criminal laws in the United States and their 
counterparts in the European Union. While the EU still has to rely entirely on member 
state authorities to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crime, even when crime spills 
across state borders, the United States can call on well-established federal institutions to 
respond to interstate crime. The easy availability of federal prosecution offers a possible 
explanation for why the U.S. has been less attentive than the EU to the need to 
strengthen and harmonize interstate cooperation mechanisms. 
III. Criminal Procedure and Federalism 
American federalism principles have also affected criminal procedure in the United 
States. Each of the fifty states has its own criminal procedure system, governed by rules, 
statutes, and a state constitution.24 Several factors have helped to harmonize state laws, 
                                                                                                                                                             
availability and quality of indigent defense at the federal level are generally better than in most state 
jurisdictions. 
23 Thompson, supra note 16, at 1209-10. 
24 While states are bound by the federal Constitution, the federal government is not bound by state 
constitutions. Federal law enforcement agents operating in a particular state therefore need to follow only 
federal rules, federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution. Federal prosecutors, however, must comply with 
the ethical rules of states in which they “engage in …attorney’s duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a). 
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though as discussed later, important differences remain. First, the U.S. Constitution sets 
a minimum threshold of procedural protections that all states and the federal 
government must provide in criminal cases. States must all honor the right to counsel, 
the privilege against self-incrimination, the prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right to due process, among others. Likewise, the English legal tradition, and its 
preference for adversarial criminal procedure, provides a common starting point for 
criminal procedure rules across the United States.25 The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice have also 
served as influential models for states to follow.26  
A review of the history of “incorporation”—the doctrine that applied federal 
constitutional rights provisions to the states—helps illustrate the sources of convergence 
and divergence in state criminal processes. Early in American history, the Supreme 
Court held that the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights, which contains key protections of 
individual rights in criminal cases, applied only to the federal government.27 As a result, 
states remained free to experiment with their own criminal procedures, and wide 
variation existed among them in this respect. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, 
however, the Supreme Court gradually began reviewing state criminal procedures for 
their consistency with the U.S. Constitution.28 Relying on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court invalidated state procedures that violated “a 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked fundamental.”29 The Court accordingly overturned state convictions for various 
                                                 
25 LaFave et al., supra note 13, § 1.3(d). 
26 Id. §§ 1.3(e),(f). 
27 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
28 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). See generally Tracey Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 217-19 (2003). 
29 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
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procedural defects, including race discrimination in jury selection, failure to ensure the 
impartiality of the court, and failure to appoint counsel in capital cases.30  
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began applying U.S. constitutional principles even 
more firmly to state criminal procedures.31 Based on the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court required states to comply with all provisions in the Bill of Rights that were found 
to be “fundamental and essential to a fair trial.”32 Once a provision was thus 
“incorporated”, it was applied to all states in the same manner, producing substantial 
procedural uniformity across the country.33 Incorporation effectively ensured that all 
fifty states and the federal government afford individuals the same broad set of robust 
procedural rights in criminal cases.34  
While incorporation helped harmonize state criminal procedure rules, other factors 
have provided a counterbalance to this trend. As the U.S. Constitution sets only a 
minimum standard for criminal procedures, states remain free to provide more 
generous protection of individual rights in criminal cases. Most have chosen to do so. 
Starting in the late 1970s, as the U.S. Supreme Court began backing away from its 
criminal procedure activism, a number of state courts began interpreting their own state 
                                                 
30 Meares, supra note 28, at 218-19 (citing cases). 
31 Id. at 221-24; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968) (briefly reviewing the history of 
incorporation). 
32 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). 
33 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
34 These include: the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 
(1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the protection against double jeopardy, Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784 (1969); the privilege against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); the right 
to a speedy and public trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
(1948); the right to a trial by impartial jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); the right to be 
“informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); the right to 
confront adverse witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); the right “to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in [the defendant’s] favor,” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); the right to 
counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and the ban on “cruel and unusual punishments,” 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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constitutions to provide broader protections to criminal defendants than were available 
under the federal Constitution.35  
This “New Federalism” movement was in part a reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
increasingly conservative interpretation of the federal Constitution and in part the 
product of textual differences between state and federal Constitutions.36 It also reflects 
the influence of federalism and democracy and of the notion that criminal procedures 
should reflect the preferences of local communities. On this view, diversity and 
experimentation are welcome because they help legal systems learn from one another 
and improve. 
The “New Federalism” influence over criminal procedure has only grown over time, 
so that today, state constitutions often offer more generous protections to criminal 
defendants in a range of areas—from search and seizure, to interrogations, to the right 
to counsel, to double jeopardy.37 To the extent that state law is more generous, its 
protections generally do not apply in prosecutions at the federal level.38 Likewise, when 
investigative activity occurs in one state, but trial takes place in another, the forum court 
is not required to honor the rights provided under another state’s law. As “New 
Federalism” diversified state criminal procedures, conflicts of law became more 
common in multi-jurisdictional cases. The effect that this diversification has had on 
interstate cooperation in criminal cases is discussed below in Part IV. 
While American state criminal procedures can aptly be characterized as varied, one 
should not overestimate their dissimilarity, even after the rise of “New Federalism.” 
State courts can be confident that other states’ criminal justice systems will at least 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Diehm, supra note 22, at 235-38. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 238-42. 
38 See, e.g., John B. Corr, State Searches, Federal Cases, and Choice of Law: Just a Little Respect, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 
31, 39-40 (1995) (noting that federal courts tend to apply federal, rather than state law when there is a 
conflict between the two). 
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comply with baseline constitutional requirements. State courts can therefore more 
comfortably recognize the public acts and judgments of sister states.39  
Criminal procedures of EU member states are significantly more diverse, for several 
reasons. Some EU criminal procedures follow the inquisitorial, civil-law model, while 
others belong to the adversarial, common-law model. Within the civil-law model, too, 
differences are prominent. Given this heterogeneity, it is likely to be more difficult for 
EU member states to find a baseline of robust procedural protections on which all can 
agree and which all can smoothly integrate into their own domestic orders. It is true 
that EU member states are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights, and it 
establishes a threshold of procedural rights that all member states must provide. But as 
it stands, the Convention’s protections are seen as insufficient to support mutual trust 
and mutual recognition among EU member states, in part because “compliance levels 
are far from uniform and enforcement mechanisms are weak.”40 For that reason, many 
commentators and policymakers have emphasized the need for EU legislation to 
harmonize national criminal procedures to a greater degree—a suggestion that remains, 
however, deeply controversial among EU legislators themselves.41 The difficulty in 
reconciling procedures is compounded by significant diversity in the underlying 
criminal laws, which further challenges mutual recognition.42 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917). 
40 Jacqueline Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, 14 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 611, 618 (2011); see also Europäischer Haftbefehl, 113 BVerfGE 273, para. 120 (2005) (“[T]he existence 
of an all-European standard of human rights protection established by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms do not, however, justify the assumption that the 
rule-of-law structures are synchronised between the Member States of the European Union as regards 
substantive law and that a corresponding examination at the national level on a case-by-case basis is 
therefore superfluous.”). 
41 See, e.g., Cian C. Murphy, The European Evidence Warrant: Mutual Recognition and Mutual (Dis)Trust?, in 
CRIME WITHIN THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE: A EUROPEAN PUBLIC ORDER 224, 239-48 
(Christina Eckes & Theodore Konstadinides eds. 2011).  
42 See, e.g., Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in 
the EU, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1277, 1278, 1287, 1309-10 (2006). 
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IV. Mutual Recognition and Conflicts of Law in Criminal Cases 
The diversity that does exist in U.S. state criminal laws and procedures has two 
key advantages: 1) it allows for local control over criminal policy, enhancing its 
democratic legitimacy; and 2) it provides a useful testing ground for the effectiveness of 
different rules. But variation has a downside, too. In multi-jurisdictional cases, it 
produces friction and inefficiency. It breeds costly and time-consuming litigation about 
choice of law. In some cases, it leads states to refuse to cooperate altogether and 
frustrates efforts to bring criminal suspects to justice.  
This part examines how state authorities in the United States have responded to 
conflicts of law in multi-jurisdictional cases—specifically, how they decide whether to 
honor public acts and judgments of sister states, in areas such as extradition, 
admissibility of evidence, and the use of prior convictions to enhance punishment. With 
respect to extradition, the Constitution, federal statutes, and uniform laws call for    
near-automatic mutual recognition of extradition warrants issued by other states.43 Yet 
in the other two areas—the admissibility of evidence obtained in another state and the 
use of convictions from another state to enhance punishment—no constitutional 
mandate obliges state courts to honor decisions of a sister state. Courts may balance 
concerns about comity, efficiency, and uniformity against respect for state sovereignty 
and individual rights on a case-by-case basis, or they may adopt a categorical approach 
to conflicts of law. As states are not bound by a constitutional provision or a uniform 
law, their approaches differ considerably. 
A. Extradition and Conflicts of Law 
                                                 
43 See infra Section IV.A. 
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Extradition, also known as interstate rendition, allows a state to obtain custody of a 
suspect who is found in a foreign state. The Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
governs the process and provides that:  
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee 
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive 
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the 
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.44  
While the Clause does not provide a specific procedure for extradition, in 1793, 
Congress passed the federal Extradition Act, which added several requirements to the 
process. 45  
The text of the Clause suggests that extradition should be a mandatory and near-
automatic process. Yet for much of U.S. history, this was not so. At least until the early 
twentieth century, state statutes on extradition were “in distressing variation.”46 
Extradition proceedings were often disjointed and cumbersome. Speaking of an 
extradition proceeding that involved “four writs of habeas corpus, …a conflict of 
jurisdiction between state and federal officials, …four extradition warrants, one 
injunction, one appeal, and one contempt proceeding,” Roscoe Pound argued in 1930 
that “[n]othing could illustrate better the extreme decentralization, the want of 
organization or cooperation, the overgrowth of checks and hindrances, and the 
hypertrophy of procedure which embarrass the administration of criminal justice in the 
economically unified land of today.”47  
Several factors help explain the disjointed nature of extradition proceedings before 
the mid-twentieth century. First, crime was mainly local, so multi-jurisdictional cases 
                                                 
44 U.S. Constitution art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
45 18 U.S.C. § 3182. 
46 Fred Somkin, The Strange Career of Fugitivity in the History of Interstate Extradition, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 511, 
524 (citing HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32D ANNUAL MEETING 365 (1922)). 
47 ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 175 (1930), cited in Somkin, supra note 46, at 526-27. 
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rarely arose, and there was little pressure to streamline the process. Second, both 
criminal laws and criminal procedures varied significantly from state to state, making 
states less likely to trust one another in penal matters.48 Before the incorporation 
doctrine made state criminal procedure subject to federal constitutional mandates, for 
example, governors and state courts refused to extradite in some cases on the grounds 
that the fugitive suspects would be subject to “discriminatory application of the trial 
process, threatened civil rights violations—including the ultimate violation of 
lynching—and poor prison conditions” in the demanding state.49 This seeming defiance 
of the Extradition Clause occurred in part because the Supreme Court was slow to 
establish concrete and firm extradition requirements. Even when the Court did lay out 
extradition rules, it did not always provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms.50 
By the late twentieth century, however, the process of extradition was transformed, 
as a result of three key developments: 1) clearer and firmer interpretation of the 
Extradition Clause by the Supreme Court; 2) the adoption of the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act (UCEA) by the vast majority of states; and 3) the application of federal 
constitutional criminal procedural standards to all states.51 The Supreme Court issued a 
number of decisions in which it interpreted the Extradition Clause expansively and 
limited the grounds on which states could resist extradition requests. The UCEA further 
clarified extradition requirements and streamlined the process. Finally, the convergence 
of state criminal laws and procedures eased extradition by building up mutual trust 
among states. As a result of these developments, extradition today has become a near-
automatic proceeding in which legal challenges succeed only in the most extraordinary 
cases. 
                                                 
48 Murphy, supra note 3, at 1068-76. 
49 Id. at 1074. 
50 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 106 (1861); see also Somkin, supra note 46, at 514. 
51 Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 93. 
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The first step in an extradition proceeding is for the demanding state to send a 
request to the governor of the state in which the suspect is found. For a long time, 
governors exercised a measure of discretion in deciding whether to approve the request 
for extradition. In 1861, the Supreme Court held that governors from asylum states had 
a “moral duty” to render fugitives to the demanding state,52 but the Court did not 
compel governors to comply with this duty until 1987.53 Therefore, until that time, 
governors occasionally used their discretion to deny extradition requests for a variety of 
reasons—for example, where the person sought had been a law-abiding citizen in the 
asylum state for a number of years; where the crime charged did not constitute an 
offense in the asylum state; where the motive for extradition was improper, such as the 
settlement of a private debt or political retaliation; where a fair trial could not be 
assured in the demanding state; or where the punishment to be imposed was seen as 
too draconian.54  
In Puerto Rico v. Branstad, the Supreme Court eliminated gubernatorial discretion 
over extradition requests for fugitives, holding that the demanding state may petition a 
court for mandamus to compel governors to render the fugitive.55 Yet there remain two 
                                                 
52 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 106 (1861). 
53 Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987) (holding that the demanding state may petition for writ of 
mandamus to compel governor of asylum state to provide extradition). Until Branstad, “no demanding 
state ha[d] successfully sought to use mandamus to compel extradition, even when there was a refusal of 
a legally sufficient extradition request.” Leslie W. Abramson, Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and 
Governmental Discretion, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 793, 803 (1981). 
54State of S. Dakota v. Brown, 20 Cal. 3d 765, 779 (1978) (“It would be a harsh rule that stripped the 
Governor of all power to deny extradition in a case in which, for example, the Governor is satisfied that a 
fugitive…has established himself as a worthy-law abiding citizen, or in which his physical safety or right 
to a fair trial cannot be assured in the demanding state, or the offense charged does not constitute a crime 
in California.”); State ex rel. Nisbett v. Toole, 72 N.W. 53 (Minn. 1897) (“We all know as a matter of fact 
that governors do exercise a discretion in such cases, and if they are satisfied that the demand is made for 
some ulterior and improper purpose—as, for example, the collection of a private debt—they refuse to 
issue a warrant”); see also Kujala v. Headley, 225 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1975). See generally Motive or Ulterior 
Purpose of Officials Demanding or Granting Extradition as Proper Subject of Inquiry, 94 A.L.R. 1493; Jay P. 
Dinan, Puerto Rico v. Branstad: The End of Gubernatorial Discretion in Extradition Proceedings, 19 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 649, 673-74 (1988). 
55 483 U.S. 219 (1987). 
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areas in which governors still exercise some discretion over rendition. The first is that of 
“nonfugitive” cases—where the wanted suspect was not present in the demanding state 
when the crime occurred (in other words, the suspect is wanted by the demanding state 
for a crime committed on the territory of another state, because the effects of the crime 
were felt on the territory of the demanding state). In those circumstances, extradition is 
not constitutionally mandated, but it is permitted under the Uniform Criminal 
Extradition Act. The second situation in which governors may still refuse extradition is 
when the accused is undergoing prosecution in the asylum state.56 The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that states’ “duty to surrender is not absolute and unqualified” in these 
circumstances; if the asylum state wishes to enforce its laws against the suspect, “the 
demands of those laws may first be satisfied.”57 Outside those two areas, however, 
neither governors nor courts of the asylum state have any meaningful discretion to 
refuse extradition. 
 Once the governor of the asylum state receives an extradition request from the 
demanding state and certifies that the formalities required under the UCEA are met, he 
or she issues a rendition warrant. At that point, a fugitive may petition the courts of the 
asylum state for a writ of habeas corpus to deny the extradition and to release him. In 
Michigan v. Doran, the Supreme Court held that, under the Extradition Clause, the 
habeas court can only determine four narrow issues: 
(a) whether the extradition documents, on their face, are in order;  
(b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state;  
(c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and  
(d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.58  
                                                 
56 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EXTRADITION OFFICIALS, NATIONAL MANUAL ON EXTRADITION AND 
INTERSTATE RENDITION 53 (2009) [hereinafter EXTRADITION MANUAL]. 
57 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371 (1872). 
58 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978).  
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Interstate Conflict and Cooperation in Criminal Cases: An American Perspective  
18 
 
These inquiries are supposed to be minimal and not to delve into the merits of the 
case or the procedures of the demanding state. To determine that the extradition 
documents are in order, the court will look at them in their totality “to determine if the 
essential contents are present” and will disregard minor clerical errors or 
inconsistencies.59 In deciding the second issue--whether a person is “charged with a 
crime”—courts typically examine merely whether the substance of the criminal charges 
appears in the extradition documents (for example, in a copy of the complaint, 
indictment or information).60 Next, to determine the identity of the petitioner, the court 
confirms, through photographs or fingerprints, that the petitioner is the person named 
in the extradition request.61 Finally, to verify whether the person is a fugitive, the court 
considers whether the person was in the demanding state at the time the alleged offense 
was committed and at some point left the demanding state.62  
Asylum state courts are not supposed to stray outside the four narrow issues during 
the habeas proceeding. Critically, they must not consider the question of the petitioner’s 
guilt or innocence or any legal defenses to the charges (e.g., alibi, insanity, or the 
expiration of the statute of limitations).63 Instead, these questions must be left for the 
courts of the demanding state to resolve.  Asylum courts must also refrain from 
inquiring into the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the arrest warrant.64 In 
California v. Superior Court of California, the Supreme Court noted that if one were to 
require courts to engage in such an inquiry, this would “be an intolerable burden, 
                                                 
59 EXTRADITION MANUAL, supra note 56, at 64-65. 
60 Id. at 63-64. 
61 Id. at 62. 
62 Doran, 439 U.S. at 286-87. 
63 E.g., Biddinger v. Police Comr., 245 U.S. 128, 135 (1917); Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1980). 
64 The Supreme Court has emphasized the limited nature of the habeas inquiry even in cases where the 
evidence suggested a possible abuse of the criminal process against the petitioners. California v. Superior 
Court, 482 U.S. 400, 412 (1987) (“If the [habeas petitioners] are correct, they are not only innocent of the 
charges made against them, but also victims of a possible abuse of the criminal process. But, under the 
Extradition Act, it is for the Louisiana courts to do justice in this case, not the California courts.”). 
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certain to lead to errors in decision, irritable to the just pride of the States and fruitful of 
miscarriages of justice. The duty ought not to be assumed unless it is plainly required 
by the Constitution, and . . . there is nothing in the letter or the spirit of that instrument 
which requires or permits its performance.”65  
While the majority of lower courts have read the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
to preclude any review of the probable cause determination supporting the extradition 
warrant, a few courts and commentators have emphasized that the Fourth Amendment 
requires an inquiry into whether the extradition warrant was the product of a neutral 
judicial determination of probable cause.66 Under both of these interpretations, once it is 
established that a neutral magistrate from the demanding state has determined that 
probable cause exists, the Extradition Clause “bars independent inquiries in the asylum 
state regarding probable cause.”67  
Likewise, asylum states are not supposed to examine charges of constitutional 
violations that were allegedly committed68 or are about to be committed69 by the 
                                                 
65 Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 405 (1908), quoted with approval in Superior Court, 482 U.S. at 411. 
66 Wayne R. LaFave, The Exclusionary Rule and Other Remedies: Extradition Proceedings, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE 
§ 1.9(c) (discussing the case law and arguing that a more probing inquiry is consistent with the demands 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
67 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 290 (1978); see also In re Doucette, 676 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1997); Quinones v. Commonwealth, 671 N.E.2d 1225, 1226 (Mass. 1996) (no further judicial inquiry 
permitted once governor has acted on request for extradition based on judicial determination of probable 
cause by demanding state). 
68 New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151, 151-55 (1998) (reversing state court’s decision to deny 
extradition, even where state court had concluded that the petitioner was not a “fugitive” because he had 
fled under the belief that Ohio prison authorities would subject him to physical harm; holding that such 
determinations were outside the purview of asylum state courts); Singleton v. Adams, 298 N.W.2d 369, 
370 (Neb. 1980)  (“Generally, a claim by a petitioner that the demanding state has violated his 
constitutional right is a matter to be determined by the courts of the demanding state.”); In re Gay, 548 
N.E.2d 879, 882-883 (Mass. 1990) (asylum state courts may not rule on violation of rendition procedures 
by demanding state); Wise v. State, 251 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Neb. 1977) (extradition proceedings are not to 
be “used as a vehicle to challenge acts undertaken by a sister state to enforce its criminal laws”); State v. 
Cox, 306 So.2d 156, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (claims that speedy trial rights were violated may not be 
considered during extradition proceeding); Hutson v. Stoner, 257 S.E.2d 539, 540-541 (Ga. 1979) (due 
process questions were to be decided by courts in the demanding state); Stelbacky v. State, 22 S.W.3d 583, 
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demanding state in the case. Such allegations are, again, the province of the courts in 
the demanding state.  
In short, the claims that fugitives can make to challenge their extradition are sharply 
circumscribed, particularly since the Court’s decisions in Doran and Bransted. In a few 
states, fugitives have been able to contest extradition on the grounds that the extradition 
hearing itself violated constitutional standards—e.g., because the petitioner was 
mentally incompetent and could not understand the nature of the proceedings or 
because he was deprived of the assistance of counsel.70 Challenges to the 
constitutionality or fairness of the demanding state’s laws, on the other hand, have 
repeatedly failed. 
The justifications for the summary nature of extradition proceedings are several. 
First, the text of the Extradition Clause suggests that extradition is mandatory. Second, a 
nondiscretionary process is more efficient in capturing and prosecuting fugitives from 
justice, which is another goal of the Extradition Clause.71 Third, the Clause aims to 
affirm states’ mutual respect for one another’s judicial acts and their commitment to the 
Union.72 As the Supreme Court has explained, the Clause was adopted to advance 
“important national objectives of a newly developing country striving to foster national 
unity.”73 Courts in the asylum state are thus expected to trust the demanding state’s 
courts to address procedural challenges—particularly since all states must follow 
minimum standards of fairness under the U.S. Constitution. As the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
587 (Tex. App. 2000) (question of whether double jeopardy operates to bar extradition is an issue to be 
determined by courts of the demanding state). 
69 See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952). 
70 E.g., State v. Patton, 176 P.3d 151, 160 (Kan. 2008); In re Hinnant, 678 N.E.2d 1314, 1321 (Mass. 1997); 
People ex rel. Fusco v. Sera, 472 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Welkes v. Brennan, 433 N.Y.S.2d 
817 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Oliver v. Barrett, 500 S.E. 2d 908, 910 (Ga. 1998); Kostic v. Smedley, 522 P.2d 
535, 539 (Alaska 1974); Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290, 294–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).   
71 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 288. 
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explained, asylum states can rest easy because “they are not sending [the fugitive] for 
trial to an alien jurisdiction, with laws which our standards might condemn, but are 
simply returning him to be tried, still under the protection of the Federal Constitution but in 
the manner provided by the State against the laws of which it is charged that he has 
offended.”74 For all these reasons, extradition has become a summary and almost 
wholly nondiscretionary process in the United States. 
The EU legal framework on extradition has been moving in the same general 
direction: towards a more judicial, streamlined and nondiscretionary approach. In 2002, 
the European Union adopted legislation on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in an 
effort to simplify and speed up the process of extraditing suspects between member 
states.75 The EAW eliminated political discretion over extradition decisions, abolished 
the dual criminality requirement for thirty-two serious offenses, sharply limited other 
grounds on which extradition could be refused, and set strict deadlines for steps in the 
process.76  
The grounds for refusal under the EAW framework nonetheless remain broader 
than those available under U.S. extradition law. Member states can refuse to surrender a 
fugitive in a number of circumstances that fall either outside the ambit of the EAW or 
under an exception inscribed in the EAW Framework Decision. For example, for most 
offenses (other than thirty-two specifically listed serious offenses), member states can 
still refuse to extradite on the grounds that the charged conduct does not constitute an 
offense under their own criminal law.77 Member states may also refuse to surrender a 
                                                 
74 Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917) (emphasis added). 
75 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, Article 2(4). Although conceived much earlier, the legislation 
became high priority after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. E.g., Massimo Fichera, The European Arrest Warrant 
and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?, 15 EUR. L.J. 70, 72 (2009). 
76 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA. 
77 Id. art. 2(4). 
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person where the charged offense is minor and therefore not covered by the EAW.78 The 
duty to surrender also does not apply if the offense is covered by an amnesty in the 
asylum state, if the person sought is below the age of criminal responsibility in that 
state, or if the person has already been convicted by another member state for the same 
acts.79 Unlike in the United States, double jeopardy and the expiration of the statute of 
limitations are both permissible reasons for refusing extradition.80 The legislation also 
allows the asylum state to refuse extradition where the wanted person was tried in 
absentia and was not adequately informed of the trial.81  
The Framework Decision does not expressly allow member states to deny execution 
of an EAW where they believe that surrender may risk violations of a person’s 
fundamental rights in the demanding state. Despite the absence of an express provision 
to this effect, many member states have included a “human rights exception” in their 
implementing legislation, even though the legality of such legislation remains in 
dispute.82 In two recent cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union refused to 
resolve the issue of whether an asylum state could invoke fundamental human rights as 
a ground for refusing to enforce a European Arrest Warrant, deciding the cases on 
narrower grounds.83 The Court nonetheless appeared skeptical of a broad human rights 
                                                 
78 Id. art. 2(1) (noting that the EAW applies only to acts punishable by a maximum period of at least 12 
months). Penalties vary greatly from one state to another, however, so in some countries, a maximum 
penalty of one year is possible for offenses that would be considered minor in other countries. European 
Criminal Policy Initiative, supra note 2, at 438. 
79 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, art. 3. 
80 Id. arts. 3, 4(3), 4(5) (executing state must refuse extradition where the person was already convicted for 
the same act; it may furthermore refuse to surrender the person where it has chosen not to prosecute or 
has passed judgment on the requested person for the same act, or where a third state has done so); id. Art. 
4(4) (executing state may refuse surrender where prosecution is time barred under the executing state’s 
law). 
81 Id. art. 5(1), amended by Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, art. 2. 
82 See, e.g., Hodgson, supra note, at 625-26; Mitsilegas, supra note 42, at 1293. 
83 Radu, Case C-396/11, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 29 January 2013; Melloni, C-399/11, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2013. 
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exception and emphasized the importance of mutual trust and cooperation among 
member states.84  
In conclusion, while the EU framework still allows states to invoke an array of 
grounds for refusing an extradition request, the purpose of the European Arrest 
Warrant legislation is similar to that of the U.S. Extradition Clause—to foster unity and 
mutual trust among member states and to promote effective law enforcement in 
multijurisdictional cases.  
B. Conflicts of Law in the Gathering and Admission of Evidence 
When crime and law enforcement activity cross state or national borders, courts may 
also have to decide which law governs the admissibility of evidence obtained in another 
jurisdiction. In the United States, the likelihood that conflicts of law will arise in such 
situations is to some degree reduced by the application of the federal Constitution to 
state investigative activity. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution require that both state and federal officers comply with certain rules in 
conducting searches and seizures and interrogations. When officers violate these 
requirements, courts may suppress the evidence obtained in order to deter police 
misconduct.85 Thus if evidence is obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution, its 
admissibility will be decided pursuant to federal constitutional rules, regardless of the 
state in which the evidence was gathered and regardless which officers—state or 
federal—gathered it.  
As discussed in Part II, states often have criminal procedure rules that are more 
demanding than those of the federal Constitution. In some cases, exclusion might not be 
warranted under the U.S. Constitution, but it might nonetheless be required under 
                                                 
84 Radu, Case C-396/11; Melloni, Case C-399/11 (holding that states may not refuse to execute an EAW on 
the grounds that executing the warrant would violate their own Constitution). 
85 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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stricter state provisions. A conflict of law may arise if one state’s law requires exclusion 
in such situations, while another state’s law does not. A state court would then have to 
decide whether to follow the standards of its own jurisdiction or of the jurisdiction 
where the evidence was gathered. In the process, the court would balance systemic 
interests, such as comity and legal predictability, against individual rights and state 
interests in setting and enforcing standards of police conduct. 
The conflict-of-law problems involved in decisions about the admissibility of 
evidence may vary based on the location of the law enforcement activities (forum state 
or foreign state), the law allegedly violated by law enforcement officers (the law of the 
forum or the law of the foreign state), and the law enforcement personnel involved 
(forum state officers or foreign state officers86). The different possible configurations are 
illustrated in Table 1 below. (The Table does not address situations in which officers 
from more than one jurisdiction work together in collecting the evidence, although this 
possibility is noted in the discussion). Conflicts Type E and F, where foreign officers, 
operating in a foreign state, violate either that state’s rules or the forum state’s rules, 
appear to be most common. 
                                                 
86 Federal officers are typically treated as foreign state officers for purposes of conflicts analysis. 
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Table 1. Conflict-of-Law Evidence Admissibility Scenarios 
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The Constitution offers little guidance on how to resolve conflicts between state laws 
in such cases. At first glance, the Full Faith and Credit Clause may appear to require 
recognition of another state’s public acts—including acts by its law enforcement 
officers—and judicial proceedings. But courts have interpreted the Clause to mean that 
it “only requires a state whose law is to be applied to a particular issue to have some 
legitimate interest in the manner” and this interest need not be “superior to the interests 
of other jurisdictions.”87  
One commentator has argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause may be relevant 
in certain conflicts of law cases, however, where applying forum law would reflect 
                                                 
87 John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224 (1985). The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause provides that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state . . . ” U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. 
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hostility toward the law of a sister state.88 This could occur, for example, where officers 
from the forum state travel to another state and conduct an investigation in violation of 
that foreign state’s laws (Conflict Type A).89 In that situation, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause may require the forum state court to apply the law of the state where the 
investigation occurred.90 The argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause should 
encourage state courts to defer to another state’s law in such cases emphasizes the 
importance of “binding the states together in a cooperative federal venture.”91 When 
forum state law enforcement officers deliberately disregard the laws of a sister state 
while operating on that state’s territory, they undercut the idea of a cooperative federal 
venture. Judicial deference to the foreign law in the same case can help restore the 
balance in the relationship and reaffirm a state’s commitment to interstate cooperation. 
Other commentators have disagreed with this analysis of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. They have emphasized the benefits of diverse approaches to criminal procedure 
and conflicts of law.92 They have also expressed the concern that a more robust 
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would lead states to apply foreign law 
in a near-automatic fashion, and this would discourage them from engaging 
constructively with the rationales behind the laws of other jurisdictions.93 This would in 
turn stunt the development of the law through experimentation and emulation. 
Whatever the merits of these arguments concerning the reach of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question. Decisions by lower 
state and federal courts suggest that these courts do not regard themselves as bound by 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1227.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1225. 
92 Mary Jane Morrison, Choice of Law for Unlawful Searches, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 579, 601 (“The result would be 
a great deal of pressure for uniformity in exclusionary rules and policies, instead of an environment that 
encourages diversity by accommodating differing experiences and values within a sprawling nation.”). 
93 See id. 
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause in determining which law to apply with respect to 
evidence obtained in a foreign state. In the absence of a uniform rule mandated by the 
Constitution, state courts have used the common-law method to develop three 
approaches to decide whether evidence collected in another state, in violation of either 
forum or foreign state law, should be admitted.94  
Under the first and most straightforward approach, states follow what they claim is 
the “traditional” choice-of-law rule. This provides that the law of the forum state 
applies to procedural and evidentiary issues. In other words, these states apply their 
own law to evidence obtained in a foreign state.95 It does not matter where or by whom 
the evidence is obtained. If the rule at issue is procedural or evidentiary, the law of the 
forum applies. The main advantage of this rule is its clarity.  
Yet the “law of the forum” rule has been rejected by a number of courts and 
commentators, for various reasons. Some courts have noted, for example, that the rule is 
not as clear as it might appear at first because the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rules is often blurry. For example, while the exclusionary rule may be 
considered evidentiary or procedural, the law that governs the underlying police 
conduct (the law on searches and seizures) may be regarded as substantive. Some 
                                                 
94 For a somewhat different categorization of the approaches, see, for example, 1 Wayne R. LaFave, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.5(c), at 175–186 (4th ed. 2004). 
95 State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 735-36 (R.I. 2000); State v. Lynch, 969 P.2d 920 (Mont. 1998); Davidson v. 
State, 25 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. 1971) 
(noting that under traditional conflict of law principles, evidentiary issues are resolved under the law of 
the forum; but even under interest analysis in the case at hand, the law of the forum would apply); 
Commonwealth v. Miller, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 11 (Mass. Super. 2002) (holding that procedural rule of the 
forum applies, but noting that result would be the same under interest-based analysis or exclusionary 
rule analysis); People v. Price, 431 N.E.2d 267 (N.Y. 1981) (holding, without elaboration, that the law of 
the forum applies to legality of search warrant); Stidham v. State, 608 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Ind. 1993) 
(applying Indiana law because the central question was the admissibility of evidence in Indiana 
prosecution). 
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courts therefore consider the question about excluding unlawfully obtained evidence to 
be a matter of “substantive law,” while others treat it as procedural.96 
In addition, some courts have found the “law of the forum” rule incompatible with 
the purposes behind the exclusion of evidence. Where foreign agents gather the 
evidence in a foreign state, they would have no reason to expect that they need to 
comply with the law of another jurisdiction and even less reason to know what the law 
of that jurisdiction requires. Some courts have therefore reasoned that because foreign 
officers cannot reasonably take steps to prevent the violation, they cannot be deterred.97 
Applying the law of the forum in such circumstances appears at odds with a key 
purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring official misconduct. More broadly, the “law 
of the forum” approach is criticized for being too rigid and too mechanical and for 
discouraging judges from reviewing the reasons behind the choice of one law over 
another.98 
In response to these concerns, one commentator has proposed that courts follow the 
“situs law” rule—in other words, that they apply the law of the state where the 
investigation occurred.99 This approach would be clear and predictable, and it would be 
consistent with the concern behind the Full Faith and Credit Clause that states defer to 
one another’s laws in the spirit of a “cooperative federal venture.”100 It would also be 
generally consistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. When a 
criminal investigation occurs in another state, and the only officers involved were from 
that state, they can only be reasonably expected to comply with their own state law and 
not with the forum law.101 The situs law rule reflects this expectation. At the same time, 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Vega v. State, 84 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc); Gonzalez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 
101, 105-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
97 E.g., People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 748 (Cal. 1979). 
98 Morrison, supra note 92, at 585. 
99 Corr, supra note 87, at 1234.  
100 Id. at 1225, 1234. 
101 Id. at 1234. 
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the situs law approach has been criticized for being too mechanical and for ignoring 
legitimate interests that the forum may have in applying its own law--to discipline 
officers, to vindicate individual rights, to protect the coherence of its procedures, or to 
ensure effective prosecution of a crime committed on its territory.102  
Whatever its merits, the situs law approach has not been adopted by state courts.103 
Some courts have reached the same outcome and used a similar rationale as the situs 
law approach, but they have done so under an exclusionary rule approach, as discussed 
later in the Section.104 Other courts, concerned with vindicating individual rights under 
the law of the forum, have rejected the application of situs law in situations where 
forum law is more protective.105 
Given the drawbacks of the forum and situs rules, a number of states have opted for 
another approach—interest-based analysis—to decide which law applies.106 Courts have 
thus examined a number of factors to determine which jurisdiction has the greater 
interest in applying its law. For example, courts may conclude that the state where the 
investigative activity occurs has the greater interest in regulating the conduct of its 
officers and that its rules should therefore govern the admissibility of the evidence.  
An example is Commonwealth v. Sanchez, a case from Pennsylvania, in which 
information of illegal activity was originally obtained by a California police officer after 
a detection dog had sniffed a package about to be mailed from California.107 Based on 
this information, Pennsylvania police obtained a search warrant, resulting in the arrest 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 92, at 585. 
103 Some federal courts have adopted the situs law approach when resolving conflicts resulting from 
different interpretations of federal laws by federal circuit courts. See U.S. v. Ozuna, 129 F. Supp.2d 1345, 
1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
104 See, e.g., People v. Porter, 742 P.2d 922, 925 (Colo. 1987). 
105 See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 969 P.2d 920, 923 (Mont. 1998). 
106 State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731 (R.I. 2000); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1979); People v. Orlosky, 40 
Cal. App. 3d 935 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ill. 1971); Echols v. State, 484 
So.2d 568 (Fla. 1968). 
107 Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1998). 
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and conviction in Pennsylvania of the addressee of the package. Under California law 
(as under federal law), a dog sniff is not considered a search and therefore need not be 
supported by individualized suspicion. Pennsylvania law, however, provides greater 
privacy protections in this instance and requires that a dog sniff be supported by 
reasonable suspicion.108 Although the warrantless dog sniff might have been illegal—
and might have led to the suppression of the evidence—had it occurred in 
Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied California law and concluded 
that the evidence was admissible.109 The court reasoned that California possessed the 
greater interest in the validity of the dog sniff in question, since it took place there and 
involved California police officers. The court explained that, while Pennsylvania also 
has an interest in protecting its citizens from police misconduct, the courts of 
Pennsylvania have no power to control the activities of a sister state’s officers or to 
punish conduct that occurs within that sister state.110 Since California had the greater 
interest in controlling the conduct of its own officers on its own territory, California law 
applied.111 
Interest analysis, however, rests on a consideration of numerous intangible factors 
and is therefore quite malleable and unpredictable.112 In Sanchez, for example, the 
dissenting judge reasoned that Pennsylvania had the stronger interest in the case—
namely, the interest in ensuring that the authority of its own law, “especially that law 
that stands to safeguard individual rights, is not weakened or undermined in any 
way.”113 By importing California law, the dissenting judge argued, the court had 
allowed prosecutors to circumvent constitutional safeguards to which Pennsylvania 
                                                 
108 Id. at 1223. 
109 Id. at 1224-25. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1224. 
112 See Morrison, supra note 92, at 585-86. 
113 716 A.2d at 1227. 
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residents (such as the defendant) are entitled.114 Other states have also used interest-
based analysis to hold that the forum state has a stronger interest to protect the privacy 
of its citizens and the integrity of its judicial system.115 
Interest-based analysis is also unpredictable in a different situation, when courts of 
the forum state are deciding whether to admit evidence that was obtained in a foreign 
state, by foreign officers, and in violation of the foreign state’s law (Conflict Type E). 
Some decisions have reasoned that forum law applies when the crime was committed in 
the forum state because the forum state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable 
evidence is admitted to help the court uncover the truth about the crime.116 Yet as the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and other courts have concluded, foreign states also have 
a strong interest in ensuring that their officers obey the rules of their own jurisdiction.117 
If a court considers the interest in deterring police misconduct stronger than the interest 
in introducing reliable evidence (as courts deciding on exclusion often do), it would 
have to apply the foreign state’s law.  
To reduce unpredictability in the analysis, most courts have chosen to narrow the 
interests that they consider to those directly relevant to exclusion.118 Applying an 
“exclusionary rule approach,” courts ask whether suppression under the facts of the 
case would further the purposes of excluding the evidence.119 While this approach 
clarifies the relevant interests to be considered, it still produces somewhat variable 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 E.g., State v. Curry, 532 A.2d 721, 724 (N.J. 1987).  
116 People v. Orlosky, 40 Cal. App. 3d 935, 939 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); see also People v. Saiken, 275 N.E.2d 
381, 385 (Ill. 1971); Commonwealth v. Miller, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 11 (Mass. Super. 2002). 
117 Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 716 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1998); see also Orlosky, 40 Cal. App. at 939 
(acknowledging this competing interest). 
118 See Commonwealth v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Mass. 2010) (noting a trend toward the 
exclusionary rule approach); State v. Bridges, 925 P.2d 357, 365 (Hawai‘i 1996) (same).  
119 See, e.g., State v. Harvin, 547 S.E.2d 497 (S.C. 2001); Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1985); People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1979); People v. Porter, 742 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1987); State v. Torres, 
262 P.3d 1006 (Hawai‘i 2011); State v. Grissom, 840 P.2d 1142 (Kan. 1992); People v. Benson, 88 A.D.2d 229 
(N.Y. 1982). 
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results, in part because different jurisdictions have adopted different rationales for their 
exclusionary rules. These rationales include: 1) deterring official misconduct; 2) 
promoting judicial integrity; and 3) vindicating individual rights.  
Under a deterrence approach, exclusion rarely occurs in multi-jurisdictional cases, 
because courts typically do not expect law enforcement officers to follow the unfamiliar 
laws of another jurisdiction in their operations. For example, if officers from State A 
gather evidence in State A in compliance with State A’s law, but this conduct violates 
the rules of State B, where the prosecution occurs (Conflict Type F), courts are reluctant 
to exclude. This is because State A officers could not reasonably be expected to follow 
the rules of a foreign jurisdiction. They are not likely to be aware that State B law 
applies to their conduct, and even if they know that it does, they are unlikely to be 
familiar with the requirements of State B law. Likewise, when officers of State A 
unknowingly violate the laws of State B while gathering evidence in State B (Conflict 
Type A), this rarely leads to exclusion, under the same rationale—while the officers are 
more than likely aware that State B law applies in State B, they could still not 
reasonably be expected to adapt their conduct to State B laws, which are alien to 
them.120 
Even when officers of another state violate the rules of their own jurisdiction, which 
they are expected to know and to follow (Conflict Type E), a number of forum courts 
are again reluctant to exclude the evidence. In this case, the justification for admitting 
the evidence is that suppression in a foreign state is not likely to have any real deterrent 
effect on these officers.121 Even if some marginal deterrence effect might exist, it is 
outweighed by the costs of excluding probative evidence.122 In short, in most cases, the 
deterrence approach tends to lead to the admissibility of evidence obtained in a foreign 
                                                 
120 E.g., Harvin, 547 S.E.2d 497; Commonwealth v. Miller, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 11 (Mass. Super. 2002). 
121 Harvin, 547 S.E.2d  at 500; People v. Porter, 742 P.2d 922, 926 (Colo.  1987); People v. Orlosky, 40 Cal. 
App. 3d 935, 939 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). 
122 Porter, 742 P.2d at 925. 
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jurisdiction. An important exception to this rule is when agents of the forum state 
significantly cooperate with agents from another state and in the process evade rules of 
the forum state.123 Courts tend to demand a high level of participation by forum officers, 
however, before they would exclude evidence obtained in a foreign state by foreign 
officers.124 
If a state adopts a judicial integrity approach to the exclusionary rule, outcomes are 
less predictable. One interpretation of this approach is that the “state should not avail 
itself of illegal acts by its officers.”125 Under this interpretation, if the evidence was 
obtained by foreign officers, in a foreign state, in violation of foreign rules (Conflict 
Type E), it would be admissible because the forum state “does not regard the police 
conduct as being improper.”126 Evidence might be admissible even if foreign officers 
violate forum law (Conflict Type F), as long as they act independently of forum 
officers.127 A number of state courts have held that, if they were to admit the evidence, 
they would not be taking advantage of illegal acts by their own state’s officers and there 
would be “no misuse or perversion of judicial process.”128 Other interpretations of the 
judicial integrity approach, however, would call for exclusion in such cases. Under this 
view, judicial integrity is tainted if evidence has been obtained in violation of forum 
law, regardless by whom.129 
Under an individual rights approach, state courts apply their own more protective 
rules to defendants who appear before their courts, even if the conduct at issue 
                                                 
123 Cf. State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1020 (Hawai’i 2011) (noting that exclusion in case is warranted to 
“deter any federal and state cooperation ‘to evade state law’”). 
124 Logan, supra note 16, at 322-24.  
125 Orlosky, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 939. 
126 Id. 
127 Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1302-03 (Alaska App.1985); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1328 (N.J. 
1989). As under the deterrence approach, here, too, courts usually demand significant cooperation 
between authorities between the forum state and foreign state before they choose to exclude evidence 
obtained in violation of forum rules. Logan, supra note 16, at 322-24.  
128 Mollica, 554 A.2d at 1328; see also Pooley, 705 P.2d at 1303. 
129 State v. Torres, 262 P.3d 1006, 1019 (Hawai’i 2011). 
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occurred in a foreign jurisdiction, by foreign officers, and was in perfect compliance 
with the rules in that jurisdiction.130 Courts reason that even if foreign officers may not 
be expected to know and apply the law of the forum, exclusion is necessary to vindicate 
the rights of individuals guaranteed under the forum state law. As explained by the 
Supreme Court of Montana: 
The rights and protections under Montana law enjoyed by persons accused of and 
prosecuted for crimes committed in this State would be significantly diminished if 
evidence, clearly inadmissible if obtained in Montana, could nevertheless be used 
against the defendant simply because it was fortuitously gathered in some other 
jurisdiction where Montana’s evidentiary laws did not apply.131 
Under this approach, therefore, courts will enforce the more stringent rules of the forum 
state, in order to ensure that individual rights are not diminished simply because an 
investigation crosses jurisdictional boundaries.  
The above overview shows that American states have adopted diverse approaches 
to the admissibility of evidence obtained in a foreign state.132 The variation leads to 
unpredictability and may frustrate prosecution in some multi-jurisdictional cases. Yet 
states have not seen the need to harmonize their approaches to conflicts of law. This is 
so for two main reasons. First, while unpredictability in multijurisdictional cases is 
undesirable, the flip side of unpredictability—local control over laws concerning the 
                                                 
130 Torres, 262 P.3d at 1020; State v. Lynch, 969 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Mont. 1998); State v. Snyder, 967 P.2d 843 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Davis, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Or. 1992). 
131 Lynch, 969 P.2d at 924. 
132 One may distinguish yet another approach—the “constitutional”—approach, which examines the text 
and structure of the relevant state constitution to determine if the constitution applies extraterritorially. 
This question is rarely considered by state courts, however, and when it is, it is often not dispositive and 
is merely added on to the conflicts analysis. E.g., People v. Nieto, 746 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx 
Cty., 2002). Moreover, just like conflicts analysis, it produces a range of results, depending on whether a 
court follows a “natural rights philosophy,” a “social contract theory,” or a positivist approach. Gerald L. 
Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 939, 945 (1993). For the sake of brevity, I have not addressed the constitutional approach here. For 
further discussion of this approach, see Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two 
Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 878-883 (1991); Neuman, supra, at 946. 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Interstate Conflict and Cooperation in Criminal Cases: An American Perspective  
35 
 
admissibility of evidence—is a feature that states would like to retain. Second, conflicts 
of law in multi-jurisdictional cases occur relatively rarely. This is in part because, as 
noted earlier, U.S. state laws on the collection and admissibility of evidence are still 
relatively uniform (at least compared to the laws of EU member states) and in part 
because federal intervention in multi-jurisdictional cases tends to reduce conflicts about 
the admissibility of evidence.133 For all these reasons, states perceive no urgency to 
harmonize law in this area. 
 In the European Union, by contrast, laws regulating investigative actions and 
admissibility of evidence vary much more significantly from state to state.134 As a result, 
conflicts in multi-jurisdictional cases occur with greater frequency and have caused the 
European Union to consider legislation to address them. In 2009, the European 
Commission published a Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence in Criminal Matters from 
One Member State to Another and Securing Its Admissibility. The paper solicited views 
on the desirability of establishing EU-wide rules in two areas: 1) mutual recognition of 
orders to collect evidence in a foreign state; and 2) “mutual admissibility of evidence.”135 
With respect to the second point, the European Union appeared interested in creating a 
rule of “free movement of evidence” whereby evidence gathered lawfully in one 
member state would automatically be admissible in the courts of another member state 
(the situs law approach).136 This proposal was too controversial, however, and was 
                                                 
133 It does not entirely eliminate such conflicts, however. To the extent that federal intervention takes the 
form of federal-state cooperation in investigations, conflicts between federal and state law may occur. See, 
e.g., Corr, supra note 38. 
134 See, e.g., EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW (Stephen C. Thaman ed. 2013); Hodgson, supra 
note 40, at 632-33. 
135 European Commission, Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence in Criminal Matters from One Member 
State to Another and Securing Its Admissibility, COM(2009) 624 final. 
136 John R. Spencer, The Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence from One Member State to Another and Securing Its 
Admissibility: The Reaction of One British Lawyer, 9 ZIS 602, 605 (2010). 
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abandoned in favor of an instrument focused on a different, but related issue: mutual 
recognition in the gathering of evidence.137  
Rules on the gathering of evidence in foreign states can reduce the likelihood of 
conflicts concerning the admissibility of evidence, particularly when the forum state can 
request the foreign state to gather the evidence in a manner that would be lawful under 
both the foreign state’s and the forum state’s laws. Before examining EU legislation on 
the collection of evidence in cross-border cases, it is worth considering what the U.S. 
legal framework on this issue looks like. The brief answer is that there is no formal legal 
framework. Instead, the gathering of evidence in multi-jurisdictional cases occurs 
informally and is only occasionally guided by soft legal instruments such as 
memoranda of understandings. Officers do rely on national databases containing 
outstanding arrest warrants, criminal records, and fingerprints, and on regional or 
national networks that allow them to exchange requests for investigation.138 But other 
than in longer-term investigations where memoranda of understanding might be 
adopted to guide multi-jurisdictional efforts, departments generally cooperate 
informally when it comes to the gathering evidence across state lines.139 Typically, an 
officer in one jurisdiction simply phones an officer in another jurisdiction that may 
                                                 
137 Id. at 602. 
138 National or multi-state information systems and databases include, for example, the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC), which is maintained by the FBI but accessible by local and state law 
enforcement agents. It contains outstanding arrest warrants and criminal records, among other 
information. Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Crime Information Center, at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic. The Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) contains identification records such as fingerprint records, mug shots, and tattoo photos. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis. The National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications System (NLETS) is another law enforcement network that provides its members 
access to key databases in other states, including driver’s licenses, criminal histories, and sex offenders 
registries. DAVID CARTER, LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE: A GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 136-37 (2004). 
139 See, e.g., GERARD R. MURPHY ET AL., MANAGING A MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL CASE: IDENTIFYING THE LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE SNIPER INVESTIGATION 28 (2004). 
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contain evidence of the crime, and the two may agree to work together on the case.140 In 
such cases, the officer located in the territory where the investigation occurs takes the 
lead and typically follows the rules of his own state, although under an informal 
agreement, he or she may agree to abide by higher standards to ensure that the 
evidence would be admissible in another jurisdiction. Alternatively, the federal 
government may (and frequently does) intervene in criminal cases with an interstate 
element, which minimizes the need to grapple with conflicting rules.141  
The transfer of evidence from one state to another is also not subject to any formal 
rules demanding cooperation. Officers simply have to keep a clear chain of custody 
documenting each step in the transfer and each individual who handled the evidence, 
in order to ensure that the items are admissible under standard rules of evidence. 
Officers who gathered the evidence in one state may have to testify later in another state 
about the way the evidence was gathered or passed along to the next link in the chain of 
custody. That said, the rules on authenticating evidence are relatively homogeneous 
across states, so interstate cooperation does not tend to pose a problem in this respect.  
Compared to the existing and proposed EU legislation on gathering and transferring 
evidence across member state borders, the U.S. regime may appear surprisingly 
haphazard. One downside of the informal cooperation is that it may make it harder for 
courts to determine the extent to which officers in different jurisdictions participated in 
a particular investigative action; in joint operations, this muddles the conflicts of law 
                                                 
140 Officers may also send such requests through secure communications network such as the Regional 
Information Sharing Systems Program (RISS), which allows state and local law enforcement agents to 
exchange requests for information and other investigative support. See Regional Information Sharing 
Systems (RISS) Program, Overview, at http://www.riss.net/Default/Overview.  
141 MURPHY ET AL., supra note 139, at 35-36. Federal involvement does not entirely eliminate the possibility 
of conflicting rules, however. If federal authorities simply assist—but do not take over—the investigation 
and prosecution of a case, and the relevant state rules are more protective than federal rules, questions 
about the admissibility of evidence gathered by federal officers may arise in a subsequent state 
prosecution. 
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analysis. Furthermore, in high-profile and quickly developing multi-jurisdictional cases, 
ad hoc cooperation practices can lead to chaotic and ineffective investigations.142  
Despite these drawbacks, in most cases, informal cooperation works smoothly 
because police departments in different states share the same language and roughly 
similar professional culture. More significantly, the need to cooperate across state 
borders rarely arises because the federal government often assumes jurisdiction in these 
cases. Given the rarity of conflicts in practice, U.S. policymakers have not seen the need 
to develop a more robust legal framework to govern police cooperation in the gathering 
and transfer of evidence in cross-border cases. 
By contrast, the European Union presents a system where language, legal, and 
cultural differences prevent effective police cooperation in transnational cases and 
where no federal police force or prosecutor exists to intervene and eliminate conflict. 
Accordingly, EU legislators have perceived the need to establish formal rules requiring 
cooperation in the gathering of evidence in transnational cases. Under the first 
comprehensive EU instrument concerning this issue, the Framework Decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant (EEW),143 authorities in one member state could request 
another member state to provide them with specified “objects, documents, and data” 
for use in a criminal proceeding144 and, if necessary, to conduct a search and seizure of 
private premises to obtain the items.145 To ensure that these items could be introduced 
into evidence in the demanding state’s courts, the demanding state could lay out certain 
                                                 
142 See id. 
143 As explained later in this Section, the Framework Decision has now been superseded by the Directive 
on the European Investigation Order.  
144 The request may include “objects, documents or data from a third party, from a search of premises 
including the private premises of the suspect, historical data on the use of any services including financial 
transactions, historical records of statements, interviews and hearings, and other records, including the 
results of special investigative techniques.” Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA, pmbl. (7). 
145 The Warrant may not, however, be used to require the taking of statements or initiating other types of 
hearings involving suspects or witnesses; to carry out a bodily examination or obtain bodily material; to 
obtain information in real time such as through the interception of communications; to conduct analysis 
of data or objects; or to obtain communications data retained by providers. Id. art. 4(2). 
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procedures to be followed in the gathering of evidence. The executing state was 
required to follow these procedures, unless doing so would be “contrary to the 
fundamental principles of law of the executing State.”146 The executing state was 
generally required to comply with an Evidence Warrant and had only a few limited 
grounds for refusal.147 For a number of specified serious offenses, a state could not 
refuse to comply even if the conduct investigated did not constitute a crime in its legal 
order.148  
As the European Evidence Warrant applied only to certain types of existing 
evidence, however, and did not cover other investigative measures, such as 
interrogations, undercover work, wiretapping, or the gathering of bodily evidence, 
some member states viewed it as insufficient to address the needs of law enforcement in 
multi-jurisdictional cases. These states proposed legislation for a European 
Investigation Order, which was adopted in March 2014. It replaced the Framework 
Decision on the Evidence Warrant, and it allows member states to request a broader 
array of investigative measures to be taken in other member states.149  
As under the Evidence Warrant framework, the state issuing an Investigation Order 
can lay out particular procedures to be followed during the investigation to ensure that 
evidence obtained can be used at trial in its courts.150 The executing state is expected to 
follow these procedures as long as they do not contravene fundamental rules in its legal 
                                                 
146 Id. art. 12. 
147 The executing state may refuse to comply with the request on limited grounds—for example, that 
doing so would violate double jeopardy protections, that an immunity or privilege under the law of the 
executing state makes it impossible to execute the EEW; or that providing the evidence would harm 
national security, jeopardize the source of the information, or require the use of classified intelligence 
material. Id. art. 13.  
148 Id. art. 14. 
149 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Regarding the European Investigation Order 
in Criminal Matters, 07.03.2014, PE-CONS 122/13. 
150 Id. art. 9(2). 
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order.151 The EIO even allows for the possibility that the authorities of the requesting 
state would assist in the investigation on the territory of the executing state 
(presumably, at least in part in order to ensure the admissibility of the evidence).152  
States can refuse to enforce an EIO on somewhat broader grounds than are available 
under either the EAW or the EEW. In addition to double jeopardy, privileges and 
immunities, and limited dual criminality exceptions, the EIO includes an express 
provision allowing states to refuse enforcement where the investigative measure 
envisioned would violate fundamental individual rights.153 Moreover, the executing 
state can refuse to execute an EIO if the investigative action would be unlawful under 
its own law.154 The Directive protects individual rights in other ways as well, by 
requiring the protection of personal data in the process of executing an investigative 
order and by allowing the defense, as well as the prosecution, to avail itself of the 
EIO.155 
What we see, therefore, is that the European Union has advanced further than the 
United States in formally regulating the collection and transfer of evidence across 
jurisdictions. While the Union has not adopted a uniform approach to the admissibility 
of evidence, it has required member state authorities to assist one another in gathering 
and transferring certain kinds of evidence and to do so in a manner that would facilitate 
its admissibility in the requesting state (as long as this would not contravene 
fundamental principles in their legal order). In designing this regime, EU legislators 
took into consideration the competing interests of state sovereignty and individual 
                                                 
151 Id. In some situations, the executing state may adopt a different investigative method than that 
proposed by the issuing state. Id. art. 10. 
152 Id. art. 9(4). Although the authorities of the requesting state will be “bound by the law of the executing 
State during the execution of the EIO,” by participating in the investigation, they may be able to ensure 
that the collection of evidence complies with both the laws of the executing state and the laws of their 
own state. Id. art 9(5). 
153 Id. art. 11. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. arts. 1(3), 20. 
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rights, on the one hand, and systemic coherence, efficiency, and predictability, on the 
other. The long negotiations of the EIO—and the several amendments of the provisions 
laying out grounds of refusal—demonstrate the delicate balancing act that EU 
legislators performed. While individual rights and state interests are certainly 
prominent in the Directive, the final result may well favor systemic interests more than 
the regime currently in place in the United States, although it is too early to tell how the 
EIO will be implemented by member states in practice. As noted earlier, the United 
States relies on informal, ad hoc cooperation with respect to the collection of evidence 
across state borders, and this loosely regulated approach can be problematic in complex 
and quickly-developing cases. It has been tolerated so far primarily because federal 
involvement in most     multi-state cases has reduced the instances in which interstate 
cooperation in the gathering of evidence is necessary. 
Finally, the EU is also contemplating a regime of “free movement of evidence,” 
which would follow the situs law approach to admissibility of evidence obtained in a 
foreign state. If the EU does adopt legislation that establishes “free movement of 
evidence,” it will have a much more unified framework in this area as well, since U.S. 
states continue to rely on the common-law method to solve conflicts of law pertaining 
to this subject. This has resulted in a broad range of approaches by American courts to 
admissibility of evidence in multi-jurisdictional cases. In some of these cases, individual 
rights come to the fore, while in others, questions about state sovereignty and the ability 
to control the state’s criminal policy are preeminent. On the whole, however, the U.S. 
common-law, conflicts-of-law approach has tended to minimize the importance of 
systemic interests in efficiency, coherence, and predictability. 
C. Conflicts of Law and the Recognition of Foreign Penal Judgments 
Another question that tests the limits of mutual trust among states in criminal cases 
is whether and to what extent one state court should recognize the penal judgment of 
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another state’s court. This question may arise in a number of situations. For example, it 
may come up when a court is sentencing an offender with a prior conviction from 
another state. In deciding whether to enhance the current sentence based on the 
offender’s earlier conviction, the court must decide whether to honor the penal 
judgment of the other state and whether to accept the foreign state’s characterization of 
the prior offense as a misdemeanor or a felony.  Similarly, a court may need to assess 
whether to recognize a foreign court’s decision that sentences for separate crimes 
should be served consecutively or concurrently.156 The status of a foreign penal 
judgment may also be relevant earlier on in the criminal process. Crimes that have as an 
element a prior felony conviction (e.g., the ban on possession of a firearm by a felon) 
may require the prosecution to prove that a conviction from another state was a felony 
rather than a misdemeanor.157 And finally, courts may need to decide whether to 
recognize a foreign penal judgment for purposes of the imposition of collateral 
consequences, such as employment or licensing restrictions, sex offender registration, or 
deportation.158  
While the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally requires courts of one state to 
recognize judgments by courts of other states, its mandate does not apply to penal 
judgments.159 As one court explained, “[t]he reason [for this exception to the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause] is that each sovereign is free to determine what conduct shall be 
proscribed within its jurisdiction, and the wrong committed by violating such 
                                                 
156 Santiago v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 937 A.2d 610 (2007); Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 
1153 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). 
157 State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57 (R.I. 2005).  
158 See, e.g., Delehant v. Bd. on Police Standards and Training, 839 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. Or. 1992) (denial of 
police officer certification); Henrickson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 2009 WL 67417 (Minn. App. Jan 
13, 2009) (driver’s license revocation); State v. Kuntz, 100 P.3d 26 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (sex offender 
registration); Bui v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 251929 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (deportation). 
159 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666, 672–73 (1892); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) 
(holding that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal 
judgment”). 
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prescription is local and does not transcend the sovereignty.”160 If a state has jurisdiction 
in a criminal case, it can apply its own law and does not have to consider the 
application of foreign laws, even if the case has extraterritorial elements. As explained 
earlier, the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy ensures that this can 
happen even if another state has already acquitted or convicted the defendant for the 
same conduct. The penal judgment exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
combined with the dual sovereignty rule, allows states to enforce their own criminal 
laws fully and without regard to the policy choices of other states. It reinforces a strong 
conception of state sovereignty in the field of criminal law. 
The penal judgment exception to the Full Faith Credit Clause can also be seen as a 
variant of the well-established public policy exception.161 A state need not enforce a 
sister state’s criminal law with which it disagrees on policy grounds: 
A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal code. 
When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it 
is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public policy. Full faith and 
credit ordinarily should not require a state to abandon such fundamental policy in 
favor of the public policy of another jurisdiction.162 
Because states are free to honor or disregard the penal judgments of other states, we 
see variations in their approaches to this question, both historically and today. States 
have struggled to balance competing values in the process. On the one hand, concerns 
about comity, finality and efficiency favor deference to foreign judgments. On the other 
hand, respect for fundamental values of the domestic legal order, an interest in 
                                                 
160 Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 1153 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). 
161 People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 32 (2004); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 62 (R.I. 2005); Mitchell v. State, 467 
A.2d 522, 533 (Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (“Cutting cacti in California, uprooting the state flower 
(rhododendron) in West Virginia, or desecrating a Confederate cemetery in Mississippi may be felonies 
punishable by imprisonment by those states. We, however, would not consider such acts as proper bases 
for mandatory sentencing, no matter how they are viewed by the several jurisdictions.”). 
162 State v. Edmondson, 818 P.2d 855, 860-61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).  
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preserving the internal coherence of the domestic order, and a concern for the equal 
treatment of criminal defendants may push states to deny recognition of foreign penal 
judgments in some circumstances.  
States have placed different weight on these values at different points in American 
history, and the trajectory of the law on recognition of foreign penal judgments tracks to 
some degree developments in extradition law. In the early days of the Republic, crime 
was largely local. Accordingly, state courts rarely encountered extradition cases or cases 
requiring the consideration of foreign judgments.163 It was not until the early twentieth 
century, when advances in transportation and technology increased the mobility of 
Americans, that states began to consider the problems created by “commuting 
criminal[s].”164 States began to emphasize the importance of interstate cooperation in 
dealing with itinerant suspects, and they limited the grounds on which one state could 
refuse either extradition or the recognition of another state’s penal judgment. For a 
while, therefore, both extradition law and the mutual recognition of judgments were on 
the same path, with states usually deferring to one another in the interests of efficiency 
and comity.  
Over time, however, the paths of these laws diverged somewhat. In extradition 
matters, the law continued to move steadily in the direction of near-automatic deference 
to other states’ extradition requests. By contrast, with respect to the recognition of 
foreign judgments, the law in a number of states swung back in the opposite direction, 
as many state courts resumed the practice of inquiring carefully into foreign judgments 
before deciding what weight to accord them.165 
                                                 
163 Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
257, 266 (2005).   
164 Id. at 265 (citing INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, A REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 1937, at 3 (1937)). 
165 See id. at 269. 
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In deciding whether to honor a penal judgment of another state, courts take one of 
two approaches—“external” or “internal.”166 Under the internal approach, which is 
used by most states today, the court of the forum state will examine the foreign 
judgment closely to determine whether it should be accorded full recognition in the 
forum.167 For example, in deciding whether to enhance a sentence for a prior conviction 
in a foreign state, the court will review the elements of the offense of the foreign 
conviction to determine whether they are “similar” or “substantially equivalent” to 
those warranting sentence enhancement in the forum; if so, the court will take into 
account the foreign conviction for purposes of enhancement.168 The approach is 
“internal” because the effect of the conviction is determined by criteria of the forum 
state.169  
As a practical matter, this approach is difficult to administer. The forum court must 
consult conviction records of a foreign jurisdiction, which are often summary and 
difficult to locate, and it must interpret the foreign judgment to determine if the 
elements of the offense match up those of offenses warranting enhancement in the 
forum state.170 But the advantage of the internal approach is that it generally treats 
similarly situated individuals equally, regardless of the origin of their previous 
convictions.171 It also helps uphold the values of the forum with respect to punishable 
conduct and criminal procedure rights.172 When a foreign conviction conflicts with these 
values, courts following the internal approach will not honor it. 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. (noting that twenty-eight states use the internal approach when considering foreign judgments for 
purposes of sentencing enhancements); id. at 284 (noting that thirty-five states use the internal approach 
when considering foreign judgments for purposes of sex offender registration). 
168 Some courts based their determination on the length of the sentence accompanying the foreign 
conviction. Id. at 274. 
169 Id. at 275. 
170 For an example of this exercise, see State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 1141, 1143-44 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
171 See Logan, supra note 163, at 303-07. 
172 E.g., State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005). 
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Under the external approach, states defer to the classification of the offense by the 
foreign state. For example, if the foreign state considered the previous offense a felony, 
then the forum state would also consider it a felony, regardless of how the crime would 
be categorized under forum law. The advantage of this approach is its clarity and 
efficiency. While the internal approach requires courts to pore over foreign statutes and 
documents supporting a foreign conviction, the external approach is quick and almost 
automatic. It simply defers to the foreign state’s categorization of an offense. By 
deferring to the judgments of sister states, courts that follow the external approach also 
display comity and mutual trust.173  
Although the external approach is much more deferential and generally recognizes 
foreign penal judgments, it is not unconditional. Whether a state takes an internal or 
external approach, its courts will generally disregard foreign convictions secured 
without affording defendants certain fundamental constitutional rights, such as the 
right to counsel and the right to due process.174 The U.S. Supreme Court has in fact 
required states to do so when the defendant can show a grave “jurisdictional defect” in 
the prior judgment.175 The “failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant,” for 
example, is a “unique constitutional defect” that can always be used to attack a prior 
conviction collaterally.176 But the Court has held that “lesser” violations of the U.S. 
Constitution (including ineffective assistance of counsel, entry of a plea that was not 
knowing and intelligent, or agreement to a stipulated facts trial without being 
                                                 
173 Logan, supra note 163, at 320. 
174 See, e.g., State v. Lueder, 376 A.2d 1169, 1173 (N.J. 1977). 
175 Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994). 
176 Id. at 493-96; see also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (holding that where the defendant’s prior 
Tennessee conviction was obtained in violation of his right to counsel, a Texas court may not use it for 
purposes of enhancing the defendant’s sentence, as this would again violate the defendant’s right to 
counsel). 
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adequately advised of trial rights) do not rise to the level of a jurisdictional defect and 
therefore do not require lower courts to permit challenges to prior convictions.177  
State courts have similarly distinguished between certain more serious 
constitutional defects, which permit defendants to attack prior convictions (whether 
domestic or foreign) and lesser procedural errors, which do not permit such collateral 
attacks. What counts as more serious or less serious procedural error varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.178 Some courts examine the relative importance of the right 
violated compared to other rights within the state constitutional framework. Others 
entirely refuse to entertain challenges based on violations of their own state constitution 
and only entertain challenges based on the federal Constitution.179 And some courts 
hold that, while a collateral attack on a foreign prior conviction might be appropriate, 
the proper venue for such an attack would be the courts of the state where the original 
conviction was imposed.180  
The reluctance by state courts to entertain procedural challenges to out-of-state 
convictions has sometimes been justified on the grounds of comity. But comity is not 
the only reason for this approach. Even courts that may otherwise place little value on 
comity and may disregard a foreign judgment for other reasons (for example, because 
                                                 
177 Custis, 511 U.S. at 496. 
178 See e.g., State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530 (2006) (the right to counsel before a DWI test decision was 
not so fundamental as to require disregarding out-of-state convictions obtained without the benefit of 
such a right); People v. Bradley, 324 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to honor foreign 
state conviction where it was based on a guilty plea that was not intelligent); State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 
1141, 1144-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (honoring foreign state conviction despite allegations that it was 
obtained pursuant to jury instructions that unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof and obscured 
the reasonable doubt standard); see also Logan, supra note, at 310. 
179 People v. Johnson, 285 Cal. Rptr.  394, 399 (1991) (as long as foreign conviction was valid under the 
laws of the foreign state and under the U.S. Constitution, California courts will not examine whether the 
procedures of the foreign state afforded the same protection as those in California); State v. Graves, 947 
P.2d 209 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to measure the constitutional validity of an out-of-state conviction 
by Oregon constitutional standards). 
180 These courts are therefore adopting a position similar to that commonly adopted in extradition cases. 
See State v. Marshall, 581 A.2d 538, 541 (1990); see also St. John v. Sargent, 569 F. Supp. 696, 697-98 (N.D. 
Cal. 1983). 
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the elements of the foreign offense are different from those required for enhancement 
under domestic law) often refuse to consider procedural defects as grounds for non-
recognition of the foreign judgment.181 Their reluctance to consider procedural 
challenges thus has less to do with deference to foreign states and more with an interest 
in efficiency and finality. These courts are concerned that if they open the door to a 
broad array of procedural challenges to prior convictions, defendants would file many 
frivolous claims, and sorting through these claims would impose an unbearable burden 
on the court’s resources.182 
In brief, when a court decides whether to honor a foreign penal judgment, it must 
address concerns similar to those arising in extradition proceedings and in decisions on 
the admissibility of evidence obtained in a foreign state. Comity and efficiency push 
states toward recognition foreign judgments, while concerns about the equal treatment 
of defendants and about respecting fundamental legal principles of the domestic order 
push against it. The clash between these values is much more pronounced in the 
decision on whether to recognize penal judgments and whether to admit evidence than 
it is in extradition decisions. In deciding extradition questions, asylum courts are not 
asked to apply foreign law in their judgments. By contrast, when a foreign judgment is 
recognized for purposes of sentence enhancement or indictment, or when foreign law is 
applied to determine the admissibility of evidence, that foreign law is steering the 
forum court’s decision. Courts may perceive that deference to the foreign law puts the 
citizens of their state “at the mercy of another state’s criminal policy.”183 As a result, 
they are much less likely to give such deference in the context of recognizing judgments 
or admitting evidence than they are in the context of extradition.  
                                                 
181 E.g., State v. Heaps, 677 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
182 Id. at 1145; see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994) (noting that ease of 
administration and finality supports limiting challenges to prior convictions to those based on a 
“jurisdictional defect”). 
183 Id. 
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The European Union has not yet developed legislation that specifically addresses the 
recognition of foreign judgments for purposes of determining elements of a crime, 
enhancing a sentence, or imposing collateral consequences on a recidivist. But it has 
adopted Framework Decisions on recognizing judgments for purposes of transferring 
prisoners to serve their sentences in another state and for purposes of transferring 
convicted offenders to serve out their sentences under supervised release in another 
state. The professed aim of this legislation is “to facilitate[e] the social rehabilitation of 
the sentenced person.”184 The real goal, however, appears to be efficiency—specifically, 
“to alleviate the burden of prisons in EU Member States by allowing for the transfer, 
without their consent, of sentenced persons to their country of nationality.”185  
The recognition of judgments in this context may have significant financial and 
practical implications for the executing state. These implications are more significant 
than in an extradition case, where the burden of enforcing the law against a person is 
essentially outsourced to another state. Therefore, it would not be surprising if EU 
member states invoke the grounds of refusal in these Framework Decisions more 
frequently than they do in extradition cases.  
At the same time, these Framework Decisions are not asking national courts to 
directly apply foreign law in their own judgment about guilt or innocence (as when a 
prior foreign conviction is an element of the crime) or about punishment (as when a 
prior foreign conviction is used to enhance a sentence). No EU instruments currently 
regulate how domestic courts should treat foreign judgments for these purposes, 
leaving member states to rely on their own conflicts of law principles. States remain free 
to decide how they balance concerns about individual rights, equal treatment, and local 
control over criminal policy against the interests of efficiency, comity, and finality. In 
that respect, the EU, like the United States, has yet to adopt a uniform approach.  
                                                 
184 Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, pmbl. para.9. 
185 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Third Wave of Third Pillar Law, 34 EUR. L. REV. 523, 542 (2009). 





 Like the European Union, the United States has had to grapple with complex 
questions about choice of law and mutual recognition in cases that spill across state 
borders. The American constitutional framework vests states with primary authority 
over criminal law and criminal procedure. Local control over criminal cases is valued 
for its democratic legitimacy and for providing a diversity of approaches that could 
help states identify best practices. These same features, however, can give rise to 
conflicts of law when states must address inter-state criminal activity and law 
enforcement. American states—like EU member states—have devised approaches to 
manage these conflicts and to encourage cooperation in the enforcement of criminal 
law, but in most cases, these approaches are surprisingly non-uniform. 
In some areas, as in extradition, conflicts of law are less momentous and interstate 
cooperation is mandated by the federal Constitution. As a result, extradition has 
become a fairly streamlined and predictable process. In other areas, however, such as 
the admissibility of evidence obtained in another state or the recognition of foreign 
penal judgments, courts still rely on a variety of conflicts of law approaches to decide 
which law governs. In this process, states often strive to find a balance between, on the 
one hand, comity and efficiency, and on the other, upholding individual rights and 
local criminal policy preferences. This balancing approach is sensitive to the different 
interests at stake, but it is less predictable and less efficient than the uniform approach 
we see in extradition cases. 
Despite the costs of the decentralized, case-by-case conflicts approach, neither courts 
nor policymakers in the United States appear to perceive a need to adopt more uniform 
rules to govern choice of law in multi-jurisdictional cases. This attitude is likely the 
result of two key factors, which distinguish the U.S. criminal justice system from that of 
the EU. First, as result of their common English law origins and a long process of cross-
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fertilization, the criminal laws and procedures of the fifty states are less diverse than the 
criminal laws and procedures of the EU member states. In addition, the incorporation 
doctrine ensures that all U.S. states must provide a constitutionally mandated baseline 
of procedural protections in criminal cases. This minimum standard of procedural 
fairness (which is enforced by state and federal courts alike) strengthens mutual trust 
among state courts and enforcement authorities and thus helps to encourage deference 
and cooperation in multi-state cases. Finally, when a case has interstate elements, states 
can and often do involve the federal government, either through joint task forces or by 
transferring the case to the federal government entirely. This further decreases conflict 
in such cases and lessens the perceived need to harmonize rules for interstate 
cooperation. 
The EU has faced similar dilemmas in deciding how broadly to grant mutual 
recognition in cross-border cases. As one commentator has noted, “the issues lying at 
the heart of the application of mutual recognition in criminal law at EU level [are] 
whether there is an adequate level of trust among Member States to cooperate on the 
basis of automaticity and to what extent are the latter ready to accept inroads in 
fundamental domestic principles of criminal and constitutional law.”186 Compared to 
the United States, however, the EU comprises much more diverse criminal justice 
systems, and it lacks the machinery to enforce criminal law at the federal level. As a 
result, EU legislators have perceived a greater urgency to create uniform rules on 
cooperation in multi-jurisdictional criminal cases. The EU has thus passed measures on 
extradition, the gathering of evidence, and the transfer of prisoners, among other 
matters, and it seems poised to extend mutual recognition instruments even further. 
The American experience suggests, however, that mutual recognition operates more 
effectively when certain minimum standards of procedural fairness are achieved among 
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the cooperating states. Harmonization of substantive criminal law also aids mutual 
recognition, but it does not appear to be as central to the process as harmonization of 
procedural safeguards. Therefore, commentators are correct to suggest that, for mutual 
recognition to be effective in the EU, Union legislators must focus on developing a set of 
shared procedural standards that would undergird and enhance mutual trust among 
the member states.187  
                                                 
187 Cf. id.; Murphy, supra note 41, at 239-48; Hodgson, supra note 40. 
